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Rule 41 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 102 
not to grant a continuance. Griffiths v. Ham- In malpractice action, motion for contin-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). uance based on plaintiffs inability to serve 
—New theory of case. subpoena on vacationing medical witness was 
Continuance could be obtained to develop a properly denied, where plaintiff had made no 
theory of the case suggested after issue joined effort to depose witness and had never con-
and before trial. Tiernan v. Trewick, 2 Utah tacted witness for the purpose of testifying. 
393 (1877). Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 
—Procedural delays. 197®' . . _ _
 J U 4 , 
Court properly denied motion for contin- After plaintiff had been granted one contin-
uance in action based on credit card obligation uance because of unavailability of her pre-
which had been procedurally delayed for two ferred expert witness, and her second request 
and a half years by interrogatories and by vari- for a continuance several months later was 
ous motions of the defendant; and although solely due to her own failure to retain and des-
trial date had been set for four months, motion ignate a new expert witness in a timely man-
for continuance was not filed until nine days ner, there was no abuse in the district court's 
before trial. First Sec. Bank v. Johnson, 540 denial of plaintiffs second motion. Hill v. 
P.2d 521 (Utah 19751 Dickerson. 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
—Supporting affidavits. Need. 
Subdivision (b) does not require affidavits to
 w h e r e J.he defendant's counsel had three 
accompany a motion for continuance. Bairas v.
 w e e k g e f t r i a l a n d w h e r e f ^ 
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 37o (1962). ^ ^
 p ^ p 0 r t e d l y i m p o r t a n t to h i g ^ 
—Unavailable witness. were actually present at trial and thus subject 
Lack of diligence. to cross-examination, the purely speculative 
Where subpoena for absent witness was not need for a third witness did not entitle the de-
placed in hands of an officer for service until fendant to the granting of a motion for contin-
the morning the case was called for trial, uance. State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109 
though it had been set for several weeks, and (Utah 1985). 
the witness had testified at a former trial, con- . m, , ,_n _, OJ nn_ 
tinuance was denied. Corporation of Members
 n^
d
^Q
Th?J1^ \ T h ^ y ^ ^ 9 P.2d 927 
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints < U ** 1978)> Holbrook v Master Protection 
v. Watson, 30 Utah 126, 83 P. 731 (1906). C o rP., 883 P.2d 295 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance uance sought to secure testimony of absent wit-
§ 1 et seq.; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 76, 80, 83, ness in civil case, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. 
84. Continuance of civil case as conditioned 
r w o i r r ^ T o o c - i * . ~ upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses C.J.S. — 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.; . y */ , , _ r> A T r> ^ i . n A A 
o o p T q m. n l 85 1fi . „ H incurred by other party, 9 A.LiUth 1144. 
88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 18 to 35.
 R e y N u m b e r s . _ Continuance <» 1 et seq.; 
A.L.R. — Admissions to prevent contin- Trial «=» 1 to 7. 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of 
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or 
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismis-
sal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless other-
wise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is with-
out prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions 
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defen-
dant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the 
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the 
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the 
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this 
paragraph is without prejudice. 
103 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 41 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, 
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation 
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in 
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground 
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The 
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of 
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indis-
pensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The 
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at 
the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once 
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order 
for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem 
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has 
complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a 
party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been 
allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provi-
sional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party 
against whom such provisional remedy was obtained. 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (d) 
of this rule are substantially similar to Rule 
41, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO 
ANALYSIS 
Costs of previously dismissed action. 
—Attorney fees. 
Counterclaim. 
—Lack of prosecution. 
Involuntary dismissal. 
—Appeal. 
-Standard of review. 
Time limits. 
—Directed verdict distinguished. 
Findings and conclusions. 
—Effect. 
—Evidence to be considered. 
—Federal rules. 
—Grounds. 
Failure to establish prima facie case. 
Failure to join indispensable party. 
Failure to prosecute. 
Failure to replace counsel. 
Insufficient evidence. 
Lack of jurisdiction. 
—Improper venue distinguished. 
—Procedure. 
—Reinstatement of dismissed count. 
DECISIONS 
—Water appropriation cases. 
Voluntary dismissal. 
—Action pending in another state. 
—Conditions. 
Appeal. 
Payment of attorney's fees. 
—Court's discretion. 
—Laches. 
—Two-dismissal rule. 
Second dismissal. 
Quashing of previous summons. 
Cited. 
Costs of previously dismissed action. 
—Attorney fees. 
Imposition of attorney fees as condition prec-
edent to permitting filing of fourth amended 
complaint was not error. Tebbs & Tebbs v. 
Oliveto, 123 Utah 158, 256 P.2d 699 (1953). 
Counterclaim. 
—Lack of prosecution. 
Where, in cause of action arising in 1956, the 
trial court's judgment was reversed by the Su-
preme Court in 1968 and the cause remanded 
TabB 
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tion with a case which has been assigned for all purposes to a particular 
judge shall be heard by the assigned judge. 
(B) If the assigned judge is unavailable, the case shall not be assigned 
or transferred to any other judge for handling without the approval of the 
presiding judge. 
(2) Notice and filing requirements. 
(A) Orders to show cause and other matters requiring written notice 
shall be heard only after written notice served no less than five days prior 
to the date of the hearing, unless the court for good cause shown orders 
the period of time for notice of hearing shortened. 
(B) Affidavits in support of law and motion matters must be filed with 
the motion or memorandum of points and authorities supporting or oppos-
ing the motion. Other documents filed in support of or in opposition to law 
and motion matters, including returns of service on supplemental orders, 
orders to show cause and bench warrants, must be filed in the clerk's 
office at least two working days before the hearing on the matter, to-
gether with a copy of the signed order showing the date and time of the 
required appearance. 
(C) Proceedings based upon supporting documents which are not filed 
in accordance with this rule may be dismissed. 
(3) Ex-parte matters, stipulated matters and supplemental proceed-
ings. 
(A) Ex-parte matters based upon stipulations may be presented at any 
time to the assigned judge. Proceedings on the law and motion calendar 
involving the taking of evidence may be heard after those not requiring 
the taking of evidence. Add-ons may be heard on the day set for hearing, 
provided proper notice has been given and the convenience of the court 
permits such hearing. 
(B) Motions for supplemental proceedings may be set on the weekly 
supplemental proceedings calendar or before the judge assigned to the 
case on the assigned judge's regular law and motion calendar. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.) 
Rule 4-103. Civil calendar management. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure which allows the trial courts to manage civil case 
processing. 
To reduce the time between case filing and disposition. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District and Circuit Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) If a default judgment has not been entered by the plaintiff within 60 
days of the availability of default, the clerk shall mail written notification to 
the plaintiff stating that absent a showing of good cause by a date specified in 
the notification, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of 
prosecution. 
(2) If a certificate of readiness for trial has not been served and filed within 
180 days of the filing date, the clerk shall mail written notification to the 
parties stating that absent a showing of good cause by a date specified in the 
notification, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of 
prosecution. 
(3) Any party may, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, move to 
vacate a dismissal entered under this rule. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; May 1, 1993; May 15, 1994.) 
Rule 4-104 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 922 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- of mailing written notification in Subdivisions 
ment added Subdivision (3) (1) and (2). 
The 1994 amendment added the requirement 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS should not occur. Preuss v Wilkerson, 219 
_ , Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1993) (decided before 1994 (jood cause amendment requiring notification to parties) 
Source of rule. 
Source of rule. 
Good cause. T ^ mie merely codifies an inherent power 
Implicit in "absent a showing of good cause"
 0f the trial court to dismiss a case sua sponte 
is the concept that plaintiff should have notice for lack of prosecution under R Civ P 41(b) 
of a court's consideration of dismissal before a Meadow Fresh Farms v Utah State Univ 
matter is dismissed and also should have an Dept. of Agriculture, 813 P 2d 1216 (Utah Ct 
opportunity to show good cause why this App. 1991). 
Rule 4-104. Request for trial setting. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for the assignment of trial dates. 
To provide firm and timely trial dates in civil cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District and Circuit Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) When a civil case is at issue, any party not in default as provided in the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may file a written certification of readiness for 
trial. 
(2) Upon oral or written stipulation or order of the court, a trial date may 
be obtained at any time and shall be set as soon as possible subject to the 
scheduling limitations of the calendar. Notice of the trial date shall be mailed 
by the clerk of the court to all counsel of record or parties who are not repre-
sented by counsel, advising them of the trial date. A copy of the notice shall be 
placed in the case file. 
(3) Special trial settings are available only in matters of extraordinary 
urgency and only by application to the judge who has been assigned the case 
for trial or, absent assignment, the presiding judge after notice to all parties 
and upon a showing of good cause. 
(4) Any certificate of readiness for trial which is served upon the opposing 
party and filed with the clerk of the court in cases in which discovery is not 
complete prior to filing the certificate or in which discovery is not complete 
prior to pretrial conference may be stricken and the trial date, if assigned, 
may be vacated. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; May 15, 1994.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- certificate of readiness, and redesignated fer-
ment deleted former Subdivision (4), prescnb- mer Subdivision (5) as (4) 
ing consequences for failure to serve and file a 
Rule 4-105. Continuances in special circumstances. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform procedures governing the granting and denial of con-
tinuances in civil and criminal cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District and Circuit Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In civil law and motion matters, except orders to show cause and bench 
warrants, matters may be continued upon stipulation of the parties and notice 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PANOS, JOHN 
VS. 
SMITHS FOOD KING 
Plaintiff(s). 
Defendant(s)• 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE NO-
CIVIL NO. 910901425 PI 
HON. RICHARD H MOFFAT 
On it's own motion, the Court orders the parties in this 
case appear before the Court on: Wednesday, 12/11/91 at 09:00 AM, 
and show cause why this case should not be dismissed for 
failure to prosecute. 
Failure to appear will be considered aquiescence in entry 
of an order of dismissal without^ftlrther motice. 
^ J/ // 
Dated this 13th day of November ,/v991. -7/ / 
RICHAR 
DISTRI 
I certify that on i±_lI2±l$/i * mailed a copy of the 
order to show cause to: 
S E E A T T A C H M E N T 
00008 
A T T A C H M E N T 
THURBER, ANTHONY M. 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
8 EAST BROADWAY 
SUITE 735 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
NAME NOT ENTERED 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
oonno 
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THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PANOS, JOHN 
VS 
Plaintiff 
SMITHS FOOD KING 
Defemdamt 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 910901425 
DATE DECEMBER 11, 1991 
HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
COURT REPORTER NOT PRESENT 
COURT CLERK KBG 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. THURBER, ANTHONY M. 
D. ATTY. 
This case comes now before the Court for a hearing on 
the Court's Order to Show Cause for Dismissal. The 
appearances are as shown. Based upon discussions, the Court 
orders: 
Counsel have until March 11, 1992 to settle this case 
or file a Certificate of Readiness for trial. If neither 
are done, the case will be dismissed without further- notice 
to counsel. 
00010 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE CITY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN PANOS 
Plaintiff, 
-VS-
SMITH'S FOOD KING 
DEFENDANT 
COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CASE NO. 910901425 PI 
T h i s c a s e came b e f o r e t h e c o u r t on DECEMBER 11. 1991 for 
a hearing on the Court's Order To Show Cause for dismissal. At 
that hearing, counsel were advised that is case had to be settled 
by MAKP.H IK iQQ? or a Certificate of Readiness for 
Trial filed. If neither of these were done, then the court on 
it's own motion would dismiss this case without further notice to 
counsel. 
The court finds that a Certification-Readiness has not yet 
been filed and the file does not peflect thitJ this case has bj*a 
settled. 
Therefore, the Court on it's own 
is hereby DISMISSED. 
his case 
ICT JUDGE 
00011 
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JOHN PANOS, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ^ ^ S S f f i f " ' 
MAY 1 1995 
SALV LAKE COUNTY 
* * * 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS, 
Defendant. 
DepuiyCtorii 
Case No. 940904176 PI 
Transcript of: 
ORAL ARGUMENT & RULING 
on Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss 
* * * 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Monday, January 23, 1995 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
REPORTER: SUZANNE WARNICK, RMR, CSR 
Official Court Reporter 
240 East 400 South, #304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: 801-535-5470 
GORDON K. JENSEN 
Attorney at Law 
Lehman, Jensen & Donahue 
136 South Main Street, Suite 721 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
MITCHEL T. RICE 
Attorney at Law 
Morgan & Hansen 
136 South Main Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
FILED 
Utah Court of ADpeais 
MAY 1 2 I S M 
Marilyn H. Brancn 
Clerk of the Courr 
„ 00381 
1 MONDAY, JANUARY 2 3 , 1 9 9 5 ; 2 : 0 5 P.M. 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 
4 THE COURT: We lost Mr. Jensen. 
5 MR. RICE: He went to find his client who came in 
6 the courtroom and left, and he is still outside. 
7 THE COURT: This is past the time this was set to 
8 begin and I have other matters set. I am going to call the 
9 case of Panos versus Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Case 
10 No. 940904176 PI. This is the time set for consideration of 
11 the Motion to Dismiss — 
12 Hello. 
13 MR. JENSEN: Hello. Sorry. 
14 THE COURT: And counsel would you state your 
15 appearances. 
16 MR. JENSEN: Gordon Jensen for the plaintiff. 
17 MR. RICE: Mitchel Rice for the defendant Smith's 
18 Food & Drug Centers. 
19 THE COURT: Very well. This is the time set for 
20 consideration of the Motion to Dismiss. I have had an 
21 opportunity to read all the memoranda that were filed in 
22 connection with this case. 
23 You may proceed. 
24 MR. RICE: Thank you, your Honor. 
25 As you are aware, this case arose from a slip and 
00382 
1 fall of the plaintiff at defendant Smith's grocery store here 
2 in Salt Lake City, one of the locations. The plaintiff 
3 originally retained Tony Thurber to represent him in his 
4 claims against Smith's. On February 21, 1991 Mr. Thurber 
5 filed a Complaint. On November 13, 1991, Judge Moffat sent 
6 an order requesting the parties to appear on December 11th to 
7 show cause as to why the case shouldn't be dismissed. 
8 Mr. Thurber apparently appeared at that hearing, convinced 
9 the Court there was good reason not to dismiss it and the 
10 case was not at that time dismissed. 
11 But the Court at that time did order that counsel 
12 had until March 11, 1992 to settle the case or to file a 
13 Certificate of Readiness for Trial, the two things, either 
14 one of those two things counsel had to do. If they weren't 
15 done, the case would be dismissed. Plaintiff's then attorney 
16 did not comply with that order and the case was dismissed on 
17 March 11, 1992. The Court specifically stated that the case 
18 was dismissed because plaintiff did not do what was asked in 
19 the order. 
20 Now, after that happened there was no motion to 
21 contest the order. There was no motion to vacate, until 
22 October 30, 1992 when Mr. Thurber withdrew as plaintiff's 
23 attorney. 
24 Now, in January of 1993, that's when Mr. Jensen 
25 made an appearance, he brought a motion to vacate that prior 
00383 
3 
1 order. That was brought before Judge Hyde sitting in for 
2 Judge Moffat. Mr. Jensen then refiled a Complaint for the 
3 same injuries on behalf of plaintiff Panos on June 30, 1994. 
4 Now, in this case the plaintiff argues that that 
5 March 11 Order of Dismissal was made without prejudice 
6 pursuant to Rule 4-103(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
7 Administration. If I could I would like to provide the Court 
8 with a copy of that Rule. That Rule states that — we are 
9 looking at paragraph (2). 
10 "If a certificate of readiness for trial has not 
11 been served and filed within 180 days of the 
12 filing date — " the clerk shall mail written 
13 notification to the parties stating that — 
14 "absent a showing of good cause — " by a date 
15 specified in the notification — "the court shall 
16 dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of 
17 prosecution." 
18 Now the Rule provides that the case will be 
19 dismissed if a party does not show good cause why it 
20 shouldn't be dismissed. Now, the Court initially did that. 
21 That was the November 13th notification. The request was 
22 that the parties show up and show a reason why it shouldn't 
23 be dismissed. 
24 Mr. Thurber apparently appeared at that time, 
25 convinced the Court that there was good cause why the case 
00334 4 
1 shouldn't be dismissed and it wasn't. But the Court ordered 
2 it at that time that the counsel had to do two things by 
3 March 11th in order to save the case from being dismissed. 
4 Now, Rule 4-103 does not apply because, you can 
5 see if you examine the facts of this case in comparison to 
6 that Rule, that that's not what happened. At the December 11 
7 hearing, the Court orderd that two things must be done. Now 
8 those things were not done and the Court said, if neither of 
9 those things are done the case will be dismissed without 
10 further notice. On March 11th the Court then ordered that 
11 the case be dismissed because these things were not done. 
12 The case was dismissed for failure to comply with that order. 
13 The showing of good cause under Rule 4-103 had 
14 nothing to do with dismissal. If Rule 4-103 applied, the 
15 judge would have counsel show cause and show up and hear why 
16 the case shouldn't be dismissed. That's not what the Court 
17 was asking for. The Court asked for specific items in the 
18 order. 
19 Let me read, if I could, Rule 41(b) of the Utah 
20 Rules of Civil Procedure, because this is the rule that 
21 applies here. 41(b) starting with the heading, 
22 "Involuntary Dismissal: effect thereof. For 
23 failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or comply 
24 with these rules or any order of court, a 
25 defendant may move for dismissal of an action or 
00385 c 
1 of any claim against him..." 
2 That is what happened here. This case does not 
3 fit within Rule 4-103. This is where it fits, for failure to 
4 comply with a court order. Now, if you read down further, 
5 the other material I have highlighted, 
6 "Unless the Court in its order for dismissal 
7 otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
8 subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in 
9 this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
10 jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of 
11 an indispensable party, operates as an 
12 adjudication on the merits." 
13 Judge Moffat didn't say an order of dismissal one 
14 way or the other. And under this Rule it has to be on the 
15 merits and without prejudice. For these reasons we ask that 
16 the Court find that Judge Moffat's order was made with 
17 prejudice, and therefore the plaintiff is precluded from 
18 filing this second Complaint and asserting the same claim 
19 arising out of the same facts. And we would request that 
20 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be granted. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you. 
22 Mr. Jensen. 
23 MR. JENSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
24 I apologize for running in late, your Honor. I 
25 thought Mr. Panos was over in Judge Moffat's courtroom, so I 
09386 6 
1 sprinted over there because he wanted to be here in 
2 attendance. 
3 There are a couple of facts that relate out that 
4 give a clearer picture about what happened here. It's true 
5 that the action was filed by Mr. Thurber in February of 1991. 
6 No summons was ever issued and no complaint was ever served 
7 upon the defendant. At no time did the defendant enter an 
8 answer or appearance in that case until after I got involved 
9 and we asked them to file their answer and let's engage the 
10 issues and move forward. 
11 After that time, I think it's clear from the 
12 pleadings here, that neither party, including — or neither 
13 counsel nor the plaintiff himself knew anything that had 
14 happened on the case as far as this order of dismissal that 
15 had been entered in 1992. We jumped into depositions, did 
16 discovery. We were at a hearing, in fact, on June 17th of 
17 this year on a Motion for Summary Judgment that had been 
18 filed by the defense on some liability issues. We were 
19 preparing to argue the Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
20 substantive factual issues on the case when Judge Harding 
21 [sic] who was sitting in substituting for Judge Moffat, said, 
22 Hey, something happened in this case back in 1992 that you 
23 guys should be aware of, at which time we went up to the 
24 bench and he showed us these documents. 
25 it was Judge Harding's [sic] feeling at that 
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1 time — 
2 THE COURT: Was that Judge Harding? 
3 MR. RICE: Judge Hyde. 
4 MR. JENSEN: I'm sorry, Judge Ronald Hyde. 
5 His feeling at that time was the proper procedure 
6 was to put the Motion for Summary Judgment on hold, to go and 
7 move to vacate that dismissal and he would consider vacating 
8 the previous dismissal. After vacating those issues and 
9 * having a hearing, he refused to vacate the dismissal but did 
10 not rule on whether that dismissal was, in fact, with or 
11 without prejudice, which is the subject of this particular 
12 hearing. 
13 When we got involved in the case and we filed and 
14 moved forward, the important things to note, I believe, are 
15 the indications that talk about dismissal for failure to 
16 prosecute are essentially a penalty to the plaintiff or 
17 inexcusable dilatory conduct for not moving a case forward. 
18 Every case that has been cited by defense in their motions 
19 talks about cases — I think I tried to point that out in the 
20 memo where there have been five years of inactivity or no 
21 attempts at discovery for four and a half years or three and 
22 a half years of inactivity and no designation of witnesses. 
23 It is our position that Judge Moffat, however it 
24 is phrased, if you look at the posture of the case, that it 
25 was, in fact, dismissed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
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1 4-103. It was done as a court management calendaring process 
2 that says, We are going to send out orders to somehow cause 
3 to keep these things moving. We receive them in our practice 
4 all the time. Here comes Order to Show Cause No. 1; tell us 
5 what you are doing and move the case forward. The purpose of 
6 4-301 is to establish a trial procedure to allow trial courts 
7 to manage their civil case processing. 
8 It is our position that to dismiss a case after an 
9 order to show cause falls within — as Judge Moffat did in 
10 this case — falls within that court calendaring process, and 
11 is not, in fact, a penalty to be assessed against the 
12 defendant, or the plaintiff in this case for being dilatory 
13 in its discovery or failing to prosecute or not comply with 
14 an order of the Court. Rule 4-103 specifically provides that 
15 the Court shall dismiss the case without prejudice for lack 
16 of prosecution if these court calendaring procedures are not 
17 followed. That's exactly what happened in this case. 
18 The cases that we have cited in the memoranda, I 
19 think the Westinghouse case is the closest to the facts of 
20 this particular case. And there are just two things that the 
21 Utah Supreme Court said in there that I think apply to this 
22 particular case. 
23 "it is not to be doubted that in order to handle 
24 the business of the court with efficiency and 
25 expedition, the trial court should have a 
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1 reasonable latitude of discretion in dismissing 
2 for failure to prosecute if a party fails to move 
3 forward according to the rules and directions of 
4 the Courtf without justifiable excuse. But that 
5 prerogative falls short of unreasonable and 
6 arbitrary action which will result in injustice." 
7 The important things to determine in deciding 
8 whether it would be a motion to dismiss or a dismissal with 
9 or without prejudice is stated later in that case. And 
10 that's the last thing I want to submit to the Court. It said 
11 in the Westinqhouse case again that, 
12 "It is indeed commendable to handle cases with 
13 dispatch and to move calendars with expedition in 
14 order to keep them up to date. But it is even 
15 more important to keep in mind that the very 
16 reason for the existence of courts is to afford 
17 disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do 
18 justice between them." 
19 That court case set out the specific things that a 
20 court should look at in determining whether a dismissal 
21 should be with prejudice for failure to prosecute. 
22 "Some consideration should be given to the 
23 conduct of both parties, and for the opportunity 
24 each has had to move the case forward and what 
25 they have done about it; and also what difficulty 
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1 or prejudice may have been caused to the other 
2 side; and most importantly, whether injustice may 
3 result from the dismissal." 
4 It's our position that when you evaluate all those 
5 considerations and apply them to the facts of this case, that 
6 Mr. Panos the plaintiff, as soon as his previous lawyer 
7 withdrew, retained new counsel. We jumped in and moved the 
8 case forward efficiently to the point through discovery and 
9 motions for summary judgment. 
10 The defendants are certainly not prejudiced by 
11 deeming this a dismissal without prejudice. They weren't 
12 aware of it. They hadn't even filed an answer. Certainly 
13 the prejudice to the plaintiff is severe. His case is lost. 
14 He does not get an opportunity to submit these issues to a 
15 finder of fact, to a jury for determination of those issues, 
16 through no fault of his own. 
17 It's our position that the Court should find that 
18 the dismissal of Judge Moffat in March of '92 was in fact a 
19 dismissal under Rule 4-103 under calendars of the Court. It 
20 was a dismissal without prejudice, allowing Mr. Panos to file 
21 his Complaint within the applicable statute of limitations or 
22 saving statute, which he has done. And the case should move 
23 forward and be determined on the merits in this Court. 
24 THE COURT: Didn't you argue many of these same 
25 arguments to Judge Hyde in your Motion to Set Aside the 
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1 Dismissal? 
2 MR. JENSEN: Yes. And he specifically — my 
3 understanding, your Honor, is that the issue — and he did 
4 not decide and told us that is something — he was just 
5 deciding not to vacate that dismissal. He would let the 
6 dismissal stand and the dismissal stands. And the question 
7 that we are deciding is whether — 
8 THE COURT: I understand. 
9 MR. JENSEN: So yes. These arguments were raised 
10 to vacate that because Rule 4-103 specifically says in it 
11 that any party can move to vacate such dismissal. And it was 
12 Judge Hyde's ruling that he was not going to vacate the 
13 dismissal; he was going to let it stand and then brief the 
14 issues as to what it means in this proceeding. 
15 THE COURT: Interesting. All right. 
16 MR. JENSEN: Thank you. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you. 
18 MR. RICE: May I, your Honor? 
19 THE COURT: Yes. 
20 MR. RICE: I have already talked about this. But 
21 if you examine closely the rules, this situation had to fall 
22 under Rule 41(b). And under 41(b) where the order doesn't 
23 say with or without prejudice, it has to be prejudice. It 
24 could not have fallen under Rule 4-103. It simply doesn't 
25 fall under that rule if you read both of them closely. That 
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1 wasn't the situation at all. 
2 Now, Mr. Jensen has mentioned throughout his 
3 memorandum and throughout his argument that it was no fault 
4 of his client or no fault of his own. And I agree with that. 
5 THE COURT: With regard to 41(b), clearly there can 
6 be involuntary dismissals based on the motions of the 
7 parties. What about the Court acting sua sponte? 
8 MR. RICE: Yes. I address that in the memorandum 
9 and I can cite to the case. The case that addresses that is 
10 Charlie Brown Const, v. Leisure Sports, Inc.. That's at 
11 740 P.2d 1368. Okay? This is at page 1370. The language 
12 from Rule 41(b) merely permits, not requires a motion by 
13 defendant. The Utah Supreme Court in Brasher Motor & 
14 Finance Co. v. Brown, states, 
15 "In dismissing an action for want of prosecution, 
16 the Court may proceed under Rule 41(b) or may of 
17 its own motion take action to that end." 
18 So under that holding, the Court of Appeals has 
19 decided that that's something that the Court can do on its 
20 own initiative. 
21 THE COURT: Going back to where I left off, you're 
22 not saying that the court did not have the authority to issue 
23 an order requiring one of those two things to happen, and in 
24 the absence of one of those two things happening, entering a 
25 dismissal without prejudice; you're not saying the court 
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1 doesn't have that authority, are you? 
2 MR. RICE: No. 
3 THE COURT: Just merely that because Judge Moffat 
4 did not specify a dismissal with or without prejudice, that 
5 under Rule 41(b), then it has to be a dismissal with 
6 prejudice. 
7 MR. RICE: That's correct. 
8 THE COURT: It has to specify "without prejudice" 
9 if he is going to permit that to stand. 
10 MR. RICE: That's correct. If it's going to be 
11 without prejudice, it has to say. Otherwise it's with 
12 prejudice. 
13 I would agree that Mr. Jensen and his client have 
14 not been at fault. As soon as they have taken this case, 
15 they ran with the ball and proceeded in discovery and so 
16 forth. But that's irrelevant. 
17 The plaintiff hired his other attorney, 
18 Mr. Thurber. Mr. Thurber didn't do anything on the case. 
19 His inaction was such that Judge Moffat felt it was 
20 appropriate to dismiss the case, and the plaintiff has to be 
21 bound by the actions of his former attorney. He can't now 
22 come in and say, Look, I didn't like that result so I am 
23 getting a new attorney and I'm going to try it all over 
24 again. That would be the same as if he got a no cause and 
25 then refiled it and said, I didn't like my last result, now I 
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1 am getting a new attorney and I want to try it over again. 
2 The fact that the plaintiff is not at fault, 
3 Mr. Jensen is not at fault is irrelavent. The plaintiff is 
4 bound by the actions of his former counsel who he retained. 
5 Now, with regard to Mr. Jensen's discussions of 
6 the case law, there are a lot of recent cases that have 
7 upheld trial courts' orders to dismiss with prejudice where 
8 the plaintiffs in those cases had an opportunity to litigate 
9 but abused that opportunity. And I would cite to the case of 
10 Hill v. Dickerson which is in our memorandum, and the case 
11 of Charlie Brown Construction. Specifically the case of 
12 Hill that was a dental malpractice action. And only 15 
13 months elapsed after the action was filed and the trial court 
14 dismissed the case with prejudice because plaintiff failed to 
15 file the expert witness indication. The parties in that case 
16 were litigating, there were just some delays. And the Court 
17 held that the plaintiff had ample opportunity to litigate her 
18 case but abused that opportunity. The same is true in the 
19 Charlie Brown Construction case. 
20 The Westinghouse case is distinguishable. In 
21 that case the parties were actively engaged in discovery, 
22 filing pleadings. The reason that Westinghouse had a 
23 difficult time complying with the court's orders and with the 
24 deadlines is because it's a big corporation, the documents 
25 were all over the country and they just had a hard time 
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1 getting things together. The appellate court found they were 
2 making the effort, and dismissal wasn't warranted in that 
3 case. Also that case is different because in that case we 
4 don't have a situation where the plaintiff failed to comply 
5 with the court order. 
6 That's what we have here, not only for failure to 
7 prosecute but failure to comply with a court order. 
8 Dismissal in this case with prejudice is more justified than 
9 in any of the cases cited. And we would therefore ask that 
10 the Court grant defendant Smith's Motion to Dismiss. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
12 Well, I read the memorandum and considered the 
13 arguments of counsel and I am familiar with the case law and 
14 the rules to which counsel have referred. 
15 It is clear that under the Utah Code of Judicial 
16 Administration Rule 4-103(2), that after a party files a 
17 complaint and there hasn't been action on the file — 
18 actually if a Certificate of Readiness has not been filed or 
19 served within 180 days of the filing date — that based upon 
20 that the clerk is supposed to mail a written notification 
21 based on the Court's order to show cause why the case should 
22 not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. And that is a 
23 very regular management tool that trial courts use to avoid 
24 cases becoming inactive for substantial periods of time and 
25 to make sure that the cases are moving along. 
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1 That's what happened in this case. There is no 
2 question that Judge Moffat did send out the order to show 
3 cause consistent with Rule 4-103(2). There was a show cause 
4 * hearing at which time — all of this is undisputed — 
5 Mr. Thurber appeared on behalf of his client and persuaded 
6 the judge not to dismiss the case. Judge Moffat then 
7 required that one of two things happen, namely: That a 
8 certificate of readiness be filed before the March date, I 
9 don't have the specific date before me, or that the parties 
10 settle the case prior to that time. So it was quite clear 
11 what was expected of the parties. 
12 After that nothing did happen on the file. And 
13 subsequently Judge Moffat did dismiss the case without making 
14 a reference of whether it was a dismissal with or without 
15 prejudice. It's really not an uncommon item of occurrence, 
16 at least in the state trial court. 
17 It appears to me that the second order of Judge 
18 Moffat, the order requiring the parties to settle or file a 
19 certification of readiness was not an order that — it arose 
20 out of the 4-103 process, but it was not an order that falls 
21 under that rule. And frankly, I think the better-reasoned 
22 view is consistent with the defendant's view that it then 
23 fell under Rule 41, involuntary dismissal. Because that 
24 order then did not indicate whether it was with or without 
25 prejudice consistent with the language of that Rule, it had 
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1 to be construed with prejudice. The party was given his day 
2 in court in the sense that he was given a substantial period 
3 of time to prosecute the case. 
4 The fact that Mr. Panos chose Mr. Thurber as his 
5 attorney and Mr. Thurber dropped the ball and Mr. Thurber 
6 otherwise did not zealously represent his client in this case 
7 is not critical in the analysis. It's unfortunate. And I 
8 think we are aware of the problems that Mr. Thurber has been 
9 causing, and some of it has been written about in the 
10 newspapers recently. And it's extremely regretable, and it 
11 may give rise to some kind of independent action — I am not 
12 voicing any opinion about that. 
13 But as far as the adjudication of the nature of 
14 this dismissal, it appears that the defendant's view is 
15 meritorious. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
16 And Mr. Rice is to prepare an order consistent with the 
17 Court's ruling. 
18 Any questions? 
19 MR. RICE: Not from the defendant. Thank you, your 
20 Honor. 
21 MR. JENSEN: No, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
23 (This concludes these proceedings). 
24 * * * 
25 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
If SUZANNE WARNICK, RMR, CSRf do certify that I am 
a nationally certified Registered Merit Reporter, a state 
Certified Shorthand Reporter, and a Notary Public in for the 
State of Utah. 
That at the time and place of the proceedings in 
the foregoing matter, I appeared as the court reporter in the 
Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable Judge Anne M. 
Stirba, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the 
proceedings had therein. 
That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss were transcribed by computer 
into the foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, 
true and correct transcript of the same. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
this, the 30th day of April 1995. 
jd£^L 
zarirte Warnick, RMR, CSR 
My commission expires: 
1 April 1999 
NOTARY PUBLIC " H I 
SUZANNE WARNICK I 
770 East 2000 South I 
• vn^MBTA-' / Bountiful. Utah 84010 • 
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Stephen G. Morgan, No. 2315 
Mitchel T. Rice, No. 6022 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN PANOS, 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
Plaintiff, : MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. : 
SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS, : Civil No. 940904176 PI 
INC. , 
: Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on the Motion 
to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint of Smith's Food & Drug Centers, 
Inc., Defendant in the above-entitled action, with Gordon K. Jensen 
appearing as attorney for Plaintiff, and Mitchel T. Rice appearing 
as attorney for Defendant Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc.; and 
After reading the Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support 
thereof, the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, the exhibits attached to said Memoranda, and Affidavits, 
and after consideration of the argument of counsel for Plaintiff 
and Defendant, 
n.FDlNCLEBK'SOFPCE 
00354 
The Court finds that the Order of Dismissal entered by Judge 
Richard H. Moffat on March 11, 1992, in John Panos v. Smith's Food 
King, Civil No. 910901425, was made pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and operated as an adjudication upon 
the merits of the case, and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted; 
2- Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Smith's Food & 
Drug Centers, Inc. is hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
3. Defendant Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. is awarded 
its costs of the action as are allowed by law. 
S> ^  day of _ Dated this 
BY THE COURT 
ANNE M. STIRB! 
District Court 
1995. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the o_ day of October, 1995, I caused two 
(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE to be hand-delivered to the following: 
Gordon K. Jensen, Esq. 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE 
620 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
